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Abstract
A sentence with an adverbial modifier under negation like Mike didn’t wash the
window with soap gives rise to an inference that Mike did wash the window. A
sentence with a plural noun like Mike washed windows gives rise to a so-called
‘multiplicity’ inference that Mike washed multiple windows. In this note, we focus
on the interaction between these two inferences in sentences containing both an
adverbial modifier and a plural noun under negation, like Mike didn’t wash windows
with soap. We observe that this sentence has a reading conveying that Mike didn’t
wash any window with soap but that he did wash multiple windows (albeit not with
soap). As we discuss, this reading is not predicted by any version of the implicature
approach to the multiplicity inference, in combination with the implicature treatment
of the inference of adverbial modifiers. We sketch two solutions for this problem.
The first keeps the implicature approach to adverbial modifiers but adopts a non-
implicature approach to multiplicity based on homogeneity. The second solution holds
on to the implicature approach to the multiplicity inference but accounts for the
inference of adverbial modifiers as a presupposition. In addition, it adopts the idea
that presuppositions can be strengthened via implicatures, as proposed recently in
the literature. Either way, the interaction between multiplicity and the inference of
adverbial modifiers suggests that we cannot treat both as implicatures: if we want
to treat either one as an implicature, we need to do something different for the other.
We end by comparing the case above to analogous cases involving different scalar
inferences and showing that the ambiguity approach to the multiplicity inference
does not provide a solution to our problem.
1 INTRODUCTION
A sentence with a plural noun like (1a) gives rise to the so-called ‘multiplicity inference’ in
(1b).
(1) a. This morning, Mike washed windows.
b.  This morning, Mike washed multiple windows Multiplicity Inference
As is well known, the multiplicity inference arises in positive cases but disappears under
negation, as shown in (2). For this reason, a prominent approach in the literature treats
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it as an implicature (Ivlieva, 2013; Mayr, 2015; Sauerland, 2003; Sauerland et al., 2005b;
Spector, 2007; Zweig, 2009).
(2) a. This morning, Mike didn’t wash windows.
b. = This morning, Mike didn’t wash multiple windows
c.  This morning, Mike didn’t wash any window
Similarly, the inference of sentences with an adverbial modifier under negation, as in (3),
has been analysed as an implicature (Katzir, 2007; Schlenker, 2008; Simons, 2001).1,2
(3) a. This morning, Mike didn’t wash the window with soap.
b.  This morning, Mike did wash the window
In this squib, we focus on the interaction between these two inferences in sentences
containing both an adverbial modifier and a plural noun under negation, as in (4a). We
observe that (4a) has a reading which conveys that this morning Mike didn’t wash any
window with soap but, at the same time, he did wash multiple windows (albeit not with
soap) — a reading in which the multiplicity inference appears ‘on top’ of the inference of
adverbial modifiers.3,4
(4) a. This morning, Mike didn’t wash windows with soap.
b.  This morning, Mike did wash multiple windows
As we discuss, this reading is not predicted by any version of the implicature approach
to the multiplicity inference combined with the implicature treatment of the inference of
adverbial modifiers.
We sketch two solutions for this problem. The first keeps the implicature approach
to adverbial modifiers but adopts a non-implicature approach to multiplicity based on
homogeneity (Križ, 2017). The second solution keeps the implicature approach to the
multiplicity inference but treats the inference of adverbial modifiers as a presupposition
(Schlenker, 2008; Simons, 2001); a presupposition which can itself be strengthened via
implicatures (Gajewski & Sharvit, 2011; Spector & Sudo, 2017). All in all, the interaction
between the multiplicity inference and the inference of adverbial modifiers suggests that we
cannot treat both as implicatures: if one is analysed as an implicature, we need to propose
a different analysis for the other.
1 See also Chemla 2009a and Cremers et al. 2018 for experimental evidence of this inference.
2 Since this inference is focus-sensitive (Simons, 2001), we use sentence final adverbs and all examples
are intended to be read with default intonation.
3 The judgments are admittedly subtle, because, the inference under investigation entails the other
predicted readings. For this reason, one has to make sure the intuitions about the reading we focus
on here are not simply intuitions about compatibility. We examined the intended reading with multiple
native speakers using different versions of the main example. The majority of them contributed the
intuition that the sentence suggested the relevant inference above. We are therefore confident that
this reading exists. Eventually, a full experimental investigation is needed to understand the empirical
picture more in detail.
4 Note that (4a) has also a pragmatically implausible reading paraphrasable as ‘By using soap, Mike
didn’t wash windows’ in which the adverb scopes above negation. Here, we focus on the reading in
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sketches the implicature account
of the inference of adverbial modifiers and the main theories within the implicature
approach to the multiplicity inference. Section 3 discusses the problem coming from the
combination of these two inferences and Section 4 sketches the two solutions to the
problem. Some open and related issues are discussed in Section 5, where we also show that
the ambiguity approach to the multiplicity inference (Farkas & de Swart, 2010; Grimm,
2013; Martí, 2017) doesn’t provide a solution to our problem.
2 MULTIPLICITY, MODIFIERS, AND IMPLICATURES
2.1 The implicature theory of the inference of adverbial modifiers
In previous literature, the inference in (3b) has been analysed as a scalar implicature (Katzir,
2007). This account arises from a general theory of alternatives and is not an isolated claim
about the inference of adverbial modifiers. Under this approach, (3a) is predicted to have
as alternative the corresponding sentence without the adverbial modifier, (5):
(5) This morning, Mike didn’t wash the window.
On the basis of this, given a theory of scalar implicatures according to which a hearer
tends to conclude that any relevant and more informative alternative sentence that the
speaker might have said and didn’t say is false (Grice 1975 and much subsequent work), the
inference in (3b) is straightforwardly derived.5 That is, since (5) is a stronger alternative,
upon hearing (3a) the hearer would conclude that (5) is false, giving rise to the inference
in (3b).
2.2 The implicature approach to the multiplicity inference
The main issue that any theory of the multiplicity inference has to explain is why it arises
in positive sentences, such as (1a), but disappears in negative ones, such as (2a), repeated
below in (6) and (7). That is, why (7) tends to convey the meaning that Mike didn’t wash
any window, rather than the negation of (6) that he didn’t wash multiple windows.6
(6) This morning, Mike washed windows.
(7) This morning, Mike didn’t wash windows.
The general consensus in the literature is that the positive sentence in (6) has a reading
compatible with Mike washing just one window, paraphrased in (8):
(8) Mike washed one or more windows.
This immediately accounts for the interpretation of (7) as this is simply the negation of (8).
What is left unexplained, however, is how the multiplicity inference arises in positive cases.
As mentioned, a prominent approach is to analyse this inference as a scalar implicature. The
5 We keep the assumptions about the underlying theory of implicatures as minimal as possible.
6 The reading that Mike didn’t wash more than one window can be forced by marked intonation, as
in (i). We put this reading aside, as it is not relevant here and can be accounted for by any of the
approaches discussed below; see Tieu & Romoli (2019) for discussion.
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main idea is that the literal meaning of a plural sentence in (8) is compared to its singular
counterpart, conveying that Mike washed (only) one window. How this competition is
implemented differs across the three main types of implicature accounts, which we sketch
in the following.
The first account is based on enriching the sentence locally, at the predicate level, where
the plural and the singular nouns are assumed to differ (Ivlieva 2013; Mayr 2015; Zweig
2009). While a singular noun in (9) has only atomic elements in its denotation (assuming
all the relevant windows in the context are a, b and c), its corresponding plural form in (10)
denotes both atoms and sums thereof (e.g., Schwarzschild, 1996).
(9) windows = {a, b, c}
(10) windows = {a, b, c, a ⊕ b, a ⊕ c, b ⊕ c, a ⊕ b ⊕ c}
When the plural in (10) combines with the rest of the sentence, it gives rise to the meaning
in (8) that Mike washed one or more windows. However, since the singular predicate is
‘stronger’ than the plural one, that is (9) is a subset of (10), the latter can be strengthened
with a local implicature at the predicate level (provided a theory of implicature which
can apply locally).7 That is, the plural predicate in (10) can be compared to the singular
predicate in (9) and strengthened by being reduced to the complement of the former,
becoming equivalent to (11):
(11) windows = {a ⊕ b, a ⊕ c, b ⊕ c, a ⊕ b ⊕ c}
When combined with the rest of the sentence, (11) gives rise to the multiplicity inference that
Mike washed multiple windows. Importantly, when plural predicates appear in downward
entailing environments, such as in the scope of negation, the singular competitor is not
stronger anymore and no implicature is computed.8 Therefore this approach correctly
captures the contrast between positive and negative sentences.
A second type of implicature account is based on higher order implicatures: implicatures
arising on alternatives and the implicatures that such alternatives would have had, had they
been asserted (Spector 2007). The starting point is that a singular and a plural sentence
are equivalent and both mean (8). The different interpretations they give rise to — and in
particular the multiplicity inference of plural sentences — follow from the assumption that
they are compared to different alternatives. In particular, the singular sentence in (12) has
as alternative the sentence in (13), which is stronger than (12). (12) then can be enriched
with the negation of (13) and ends up conveying the meaning which can be paraphrased as
in (14).
(12) Mike washed a window.
(13) Mike washed at least two windows.
(14) Mike washed exactly one window. Sg sentence enriched by its implicature
7 Zweig (2009) and Ivlieva (2013) actually make use of an event semantics and have the strengthening
apply at the VP-level. This detail is not important for our purposes so we put it aside here.
8 The sensitivity to monotonicity exhibited by scalar implicatures is generally derived by appealing
to a principle preventing them from arising if they weaken the literal meaning of the sentence.
This captures the difference between the contribution of implicatures in upward versus downward
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The plural sentence then is compared to the corresponding singular sentence already
enriched by its implicature, that is to (14). Since (14) is stronger than (8), it will be negated
and it will give rise to the multiplicity inference. This is, if it is true that Mike washed one
or more windows, but it’s not true that he washed exactly one window, then it must be that
he washed multiple windows. Again, given that implicatures tend not to appear in the scope
of downward entailing operators, this approach too can account for the contrast between
upward and downward entailing environments.
Finally, the third account by Sauerland (2003) and Sauerland et al. (2005b), is
based on the comparison between the singular and the plural predicates at the level of
presuppositions, via Maximise Presupposition (e.g., Chemla, 2008a; Heim, 1991; Marty,
2017; Percus, 1998; Singh, 2008). The assumption is that (12) and its corresponding plural
counterpart in (15) are equivalent at the assertion level: both are true when Mike washed
one or more windows. They differ, however, at the presuppositional level: (12), but not (15),
presupposes that the window was exactly one.
(15) Mike washed windows.
On the basis of this, the use of the plural leads to the inference, via Maximise Presuppo-
sition, that the exactly-one presupposition of the singular is false.9 As a result, the hearer
concludes that Mike washed one or more window but not exactly one, i.e., that Mike
washed multiple windows. The sensitivity to monotonicity, the contrast between (6) vs. (7),
is derived by the assumption that Maximise Presupposition can only apply if it strengthens
the entire sentence. This immediately predicts that it will not apply under negation, as it
would make the sentence weaker than it’s literal meaning.
In sum, there are three main types of theories within the implicature approach and they
can account for the sensitivity to monotonicity and a variety of complex data in relation
to the multiplicity inference which we didn’t review here (see Križ 2017; Spector 2007;
Zweig 2009 and Ivlieva 2013 for discussion). We turn now to show however that none of
these theories can account for the problematic case discussed above, if combined with an
implicature approach to the inference of adverbial modifiers.
3 THE PROBLEM
Let us now go back to the inference of the adverbial modifiers and the multiplicity inference,
repeated from above:
(16) a. This morning, Mike didn’t wash the window with soap.
b.  This morning, Mike did wash the window
9 The way this is implemented is by having the singular, but not the plural, to be associated with
a presupposition that the argument it combines with is an atomic individual. In particular, the
assumption is that both (12) and its plural counterpart in (15) are equivalent, as the presupposition
of the former would project through the existential quantification associated with the bare plural
and becomes part of the assertion. However, at the predicate level the singular has a stronger
presupposition than the plural. Maximise Presupposition then is assumed to apply in the scope of
the existential quantifier, giving rise to the meaning of plural that Mike washed one or more windows
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(17) a. This morning, Mike washed windows.
b.  This morning, Mike washed multiple windows
When we combine the two, we observe that (18) has a reading in which the multiplicity
inference appears on top of the inference of the abverbial modifier:
(18) This morning, Mike didn’t wash windows with soap.
 This morning, Mike did wash multiple windows (albeit not with soap)
Let us now consider the predictions of the implicature approach to adverbial modifiers
combined with different versions of the implicature approach to the multiplicity inference,
starting from the local-strengthening theories (Ivlieva, 2013; Mayr, 2015; Zweig, 2009).
Under this approach, the plural noun can be strengthened locally, or it can be interpreted
literally.10 Either way the reading we are after is not predicted. To illustrate, consider first
the case in which the noun is not strengthened, paraphrased in (19). While this may be
a possible reading of the sentence, it doesn’t account for the reading we are after: it is
compatible with Mike washing only one window.
(19) Mike didn’t wash any window with soap but he did wash one or more windows.
If, on the other hand, the predicate is strengthened, the predicted reading is in (20). The
multiplicity inference arising from the inference of the adverbial modifier is now correctly
captured, but the literal meaning of the sentence (the first conjunct in (20)) appears too
weak: it is compatible with Mike washing one window with soap, contra intuitions.
(20) Mike didn’t wash multiple windows with soap but he did wash multiple windows.
The situation is even worse for the global approach based on higher-order implicatures by
Spector (2007): not only does this approach fail to capture for the described reading, but it
also predicts the intuitively unattested reading paraphrased in (21).11
(21) Mike didn’t wash any window with soap but he did wash exactly one window.
Finally, the problem for the presupposed implicature approach (Sauerland, 2003; Sauerland
et al., 2005b) is that Maximise Presupposition is not predicted to apply in the case of (18),
as it would weaken the meaning of the sentence. Therefore, the predicted reading is again
10 Some of the local-strengthening theories assume that the strengthening of plural is obligatory. It can
however happen globally, rather than locally, which in the relevant cases discussed here would be
vacuous and therefore equivalent to not strengthening the predicate at all; see Mayr 2015 and Ivlieva
2013 for discussion.
11 We refer the reader to the Appendix for details. As a sketch of why the reading above is predicted,
consider that (18) has (i) as its alternative, i.e., the singular alternative enriched with its implicature,
which in turn is derived from its alternative in (ii). The negation of (i) then gives rise to the unattested
reading in (21).
(i) Mike didn’t wash a window with soap but he did wash multiple windows.
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(19). If we lift the restriction and nonetheless apply Maximise Presupposition, the predicted
reading is (20), which is also intuitively incorrect.12
In sum, none of the implicature theories of the multiplicity inference in combination
with an implicature-based analysis of the inference of adverbial modifiers can account for
the problematic reading above. In the next section, we sketch two solutions to the problem:
the homogeneity approach to the multiplicity inference by Križ (2017) combined with the
implicature approach to the inference of adverbial modifiers and a presuppositional theory
of the latter combined with the implicature approach to the multiplicity inference.
4 TWO SOLUTIONS
4.1 The first solution: the multiplicity inference is not an implicature
Križ (2017) proposes an alternative approach to the multiplicity inference in terms of
homogeneity. The main idea is that most predicates are undefined under certain conditions
when they apply to pluralities. For what is relevant here, when a predicate like windows
appears in an episodic sentence such as (1a), repeated below in (22), it gives rise to the
following trivalent truth-conditions: it is true when both (22a) and (22b) are true, false
when both are false, and undefined otherwise. This predicts the intuitively correct reading
of (22), i.e., that it is true if and only if Mike washed more than one window.
(22) Mike washed windows.
a. Mike washed one or more windows.
b. Mike washed multiple windows.
When (22) is negated, as in (23), negation leaves undefinedness untouched, giving rise to the
following truth-conditions: (23) is true when both (23a) and (23b) are true, false when both
are false, and undefined otherwise. These truth-conditions capture the intuition that (23) is
true if and only if Mike didn’t wash any window.13 Hence, the homogeneity approach can
account for the alternation between positive and negative cases.
(23) Mike didn’t wash windows.
a. Mike didn’t wash one or more windows.
b. Mike didn’t wash multiple windows.
Let us now go back to the problematic case in (24) and its meaning strengthened with the
implicature of the adverbial modifier á la Katzir (2007) in (25):
(24) Mike didn’t wash windows with soap.
(25) Mike didn’t wash windows with soap and he did wash windows.
The homogeneity approach predicts that the first conjunct of (25) is true whenever both
(22a) and (22b) are true, false when both are false and undefined otherwise. The second
12 Note that under this approach Maximise Presupposition is assumed to apply in the scope of the
existential quantification associated with the bare plural. At that level, the inference of the adverbial
modifier is not yet derived and hence it is not taken into account by the Maximise Presupposition
strengthening mechanism. This is because, under the implicature approach sketched above, the
derivation of that inference applies globally on the negated sentence against its negated alternative.
13 The negation assumed here is standard negation, making a true sentence false, a false sentence
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conjunct, on the other hand, is true when both (23a) and (23b) are true, false if both are
false and undefined otherwise. Putting these together, it follows that the conjunction in
(25) is true if and only if all of (22a), (22b), (23a) and (23b) are true.14 This reading is
paraphrased in (26) and this is precisely the reading we are after:
(26) Mike didn’t wash any window with soap but he did wash multiple windows.
In sum, adopting the homogeneity approach allows us to account of the problematic case
by keeping the implicature approach to the inference of adverbial modifiers.15
4.2 The second solution: The inference of adverbial modifiers is not an
implicature
Another solution to the puzzle is to abandon the scalar implicatures theory of the inference
of adverbial modifiers and analyse them as presuppositions instead (Schlenker, 2008;
Simons, 2001).16 Under this approach, the sentence in (27) not only entails (27a), but also
presupposes it. This idea is supported by the projection data in (28a)–(28d) which suggest
that Mike washed windows, i.e., this inference project out of the scope of the operators
below and in that it resembles closely the behaviour of presuppositions.17
(27) Mike washed windows with soap.
a.  Mike washed (one or more) windows Presupposition
(28) a. Mike didn’t wash windows with soap.
b. Did Mike wash windows with soap?
c. Perhaps Mike washed windows with soap.
d. If Mike washed windows with soap, he will probably do it again.
e.  Mike washed (one or more) windows
Given the assumptions that the inference of the adverbial modifiers is a presupposition
and that presuppositions project through negation, our problematic case repeated in (29),
would also presuppose (27a), repeated below in (29a). This alone however does not solve
14 Note that the implicit assumption here is that the negation of the alternatives is also the standard
negation defined above in Footnote 13; see Spector & Sudo 2017 for discussion.
15 An anonymous reviewer suggested us a similar account linked to the homogeneity presupposition
associated with distributive predicates. While we think this is a possible alternative route, we do
not pursue it here for two reasons. First, as Križ (2017) argues, homogeneity isn’t limited to the
distributive predicates only. Therefore linking homogeneity to distributivity seems at best not general
enough. Second, for the account to work we would need the homogeneity presupposition to project
universally through the existential quantification associated with the episodic bare plural. Though
this doesn’t seem to be what happens with presuppositions and existential quantification in general
(see Chemla 2009b, among others).
16 A third possibility would be to analyse the inference of the adverbial modifier neither as an
implicature nor as a presupposition, but as an inference of a different kind altogether. Pursuing this
direction would have to minimally include an account of how this inference arises and allow it, under
the second solution below, to be strengthened by implicatures. We do not develop this option here.
17 While the projection facts constitute a suggestive piece of evidence in favor of the presuppositional
analysis, we do not think they are per se conclusive. For discussion about projection behavior
and status of the inference projecting see Chemla 2008b; Romoli 2012; Tonhauser et al. 2019; see
also Chemla 2009a for an experimental comparison of the inference of adverbial modifiers and
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the puzzle, as (29a) means that Mike washed one or more windows, not that he washed
more than one window. What we need is the multiplicity inference arising on top of (29a).
(29) Mike didn’t wash windows with soap.
a.  Mike did wash (one or more) windows Presupposition
The remaining ingredient is adopting the idea that presuppositions can be in itself
strengthened by implicatures (Spector & Sudo 2017; see also Gajewski & Sharvit 2011;
Magri 2010; Marty 2017; Sudo & Romoli 2017). The gist of the idea is that if a sentence
φ has an alternative ψ with a stronger presupposition, the negation of that stronger
presupposition is added to the presupposition(s) of φ. To illustrate, and putting aside for
now the details of the different versions of the implicature approach to the multiplicity
inference (to which we return in the next subsection), the alternative of (29) is (30).
(30) Mike didn’t wash exactly one window with soap.
a.  Mike did wash exactly one window Presupposition
(30) presupposes (30a), which is stronger than the presupposition of (29) in (29a). Therefore
the negation of (30a) is added to the presupposition of (29) and we obtain the right reading
that Mike didn’t wash any window with soap but he did wash multiple windows, as
illustrated in (31).
(31) Mike didn’t wash windows with soap.
a.  Mike didn’t wash any window with soap Assertion
b.  Mike did wash one or more windows Presupposition
c.  Mike didn’t wash exactly one window
Added negation of the presupposition of the alternative
In sum, this approach can account for the reading we are after. In fact, it can be seen as
an argument for a presuppositional treatment of the inference of adverbial modifiers, an
implicature approach to multiplicity inferences, and the idea that presuppositions can be
strengthened via implicatures.
4.3 Issues for the presuppositional solution
The presuppositional solution integrates a presuppositional account of the inference of
adverbial modifiers with an implicature treatment of the multiplicity inference. However,
not all implicature accounts of the multiplicity inference fare equally well in this approach.
To illustrate the issue, let us consider first how the three implicature approaches outlined
above (the local approach by Mayr (2015), Ivlieva (2013) and Zweig (2009), the global
approach by Spector (2007), and the one by Sauerland et al. (2005b)) can be applied at
the presuppositional level to strengthen the presupposition of the adverbial modifiers in
order to obtain the correct inference, e.g. that Mike washed multiple windows. To ease the
exposition of the different approaches, let us introduce the following notation in (32): ‘exh’
here is an operator which has the effect of adding to a sentence its implicatures. In other
words, exh combines with a sentence and returns its strengthened meaning.18
(32) exh[Mike washed windows] = Mike washed multiple windows
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Crucially, under the approach introduced in the previous section, if the sentence has a
presupposition, exh will generally have an indirect effect on the presupposition as well.
The idea of treating the inference of adverbial modifiers as presuppositions is that exh, by
being able to strengthen presuppositions, will generate a multiplicity inference on top of it.
Let us see whether and how this idea works when we look at the details of each accounts,
starting with the local one. First, the account by Mayr (2015) appears ‘too local’ for the
approach developed in the previous section. This is because the multiplicity strengthening
happens within the DP containing the plural noun and no presupposition has yet been
introduced at that level.19
The implementation of the local approach by Ivlieva (2013) and Zweig (2009) could be
made work, provided we allow ourselves some extra (ad hoc) assumptions about exh and
its distribution. In particular, we would need a version of exh, call it exh′, which strengthens
the presuppositional level only, when applied locally at the level of the VP. We don’t know
though of any independent motivation for such a strengthening operator.20
The situation is even more problematic if one adopts Spector’s (2007) approach to
the multiplicity inference. As noted above, this approach gives rise to the unattested
reading in (21). This is not only unattested but also in contradiction with the strengthened
presupposition that Mike washed multiple windows. The question for Spector 2007 is
therefore how to block (21). We discuss this in more detail in the Appendix.
Finally, it is not entirely clear how to combine the presuppositional approach to the
inference of adverbial modifiers with Sauerland et al.’s (2005a) approach to the multiplicity
inference. In particular, as discussed above, Maximise Presupposition is assumed not to
apply in this case, so it is unclear how the presuppositional treatment of the adverbial
modifier would help.
In sum, none of the implicature accounts are straightforwardly compatible with the
presuppositional solution sketched above.
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this section, we enlarge the focus from the multiplicity inference to scalar terms more
generally and their interaction with modifiers under negation. Before that, let us brief ly note
that the other main non-implicature approach to the multiplicity inference, the ambiguity
approach (Farkas & de Swart, 2010; Grimm, 2013; Martí, 2017), does not solve our
problem. To illustrate, the main idea of this approach is that a plural noun like windows
is ambiguous between an inclusive interpretation which includes atomic elements and
19 In other words, the LF predicted by Mayr (2015) is (i) (where EXH2 is the exhaustivity operator
generalised to the predicative level). Therefore the strengthened restrictor will combine with both
the assertion and the presupposition of the predicate giving rise to the reading in (ii), which is too
weak in the assertion part. So in this sense, Mayr’s account is ‘too local’ to work.
(i) not[∃ [EXH2 windows ]] [λ2[ Mike washed t2 with soap ]]
(ii) a. Assertion: There is no window plurality which Mike washed with soap.
b. Presupposition: There is a window plurality which Mike washed.
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sums thereof and an exclusive interpretation which only includes sums, giving rise to the
interpretations in (33) and (34), respectively. The choice between the two meanings is
regulated by the Strongest Meaning Hypothesis which favors the strongest reading—the
one that asymmetrically entails the other—i.e., the exclusive interpretation in positive cases
and the inclusive one in negative ones.
(33) Mike washed one or more windows. inclusive
(34) Mike washed more than one window. exclusive
The ambiguity approach however cannot account for our problematic data, regardless of
whether it is combined with the implicature or the presuppositional account of adverbial
modifiers. The problem is that in order to obtain the intended reading, we would need
to somehow select the inclusive meaning of windows in the asserted component of the
sentence and the exclusive one in the presupposed/implicated part and it is unclear how to
do it compositionally.21 Thus the ambiguity approach cannot account for the interpretation
we are after and we do not see any obvious amendment to this theory which would allow
it to.22
The discussion on the interaction of multiplicity inference with modifiers under negation
extends in interesting ways to other scalar terms, such as scalar adjectives and disjunction.23
As a start, consider the sentence in (35) with a scalar adjective good and an adverbial
modifier gladly under negation. Intuitively, (35) — if anything — suggests (35a). While
this inference is a subtle one, it is clear that the sentence doesn’t give rise to the opposite
inference, namely that Patricia gave Peter an excellent grade. This however is precisely the
inference predicted by the implicature approach.24
21 One could consider allowing different denotations of the plural to be used in the assertion and
presuppositional levels. This would however predict that in case of lexical ambiguity, different
meanings could be selected at these different levels. For instance, (i) should be able to obtain the
reading paraphrased in (ii), in which bank obtains a different interpretation in the assertion and the
presuppositional levels, contrary to facts.
(i) Patricia knows that the fisherman went to the bank.
(ii) Patricia believes that the fisherman went to the bank1 and the fisherman did go to the bank2.
22 As discussed by Farkas & de Swart (2010); Ivlieva (2013); Spector (2007) and Križ (2017), the ambiguity
approach also has problems with accounting for the multiplicity inference in sentences with non-
monotonic quantifiers, as in (i):
(i) Exactly two students solved problems.
 Two students solved more than one problem and all of the others didn’t solve any problems
23 Many thanks to Benjamin Spector (p.c.) for helpful discussion on the issues discussed in this
section.
24 This is because among the alternatives of (35) we have (i), which is not entailed by the assertion and
therefore ends up being negated, giving rise to the inference that Patricia gave Peter an excellent
grade.
(i) Patricia didn’t give Peter an excellent grade.
Note, however, that a sentence like (36) is challenging for the implicature approach to the inference
of adverbial modifiers only to the extent that one can show that the alternative in (i) is relevant in the
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(35) Patricia didn’t give Peter a good grade gladly.
a.  Patricia gave Peter a good grade (but not an excellent one)
The presuppositional approach to the inference of adverbial modifiers, on the other hand,
predicts the inference in (35a), as it is the (strengthened) presupposition of (36), which
projects through negation.
(36) Patricia gave Peter a good grade gladly.
This could be taken as an argument for the presuppositional view of the inference of
adverbial modifiers. However, when we look at other scalar terms, like disjunction, the
implicature approach to adverbial modifiers appears to fare better.
Consider first the case of the free choice inference, triggered by a disjunction embedded
in the scope of a possibility modal, analysed by many as an implicature.25 (37) gives rise to
the inference that each of the disjunct is possible: Miriam can play with her computer and
she can play with her i-Pad (though possibly not with both).
(37) Miriam can play with her computer or her i-Pad.
a.  Miriam can play with her computer and she can play with her i-Pad
Now consider (38): the analogous case to the one we focused on above, involving a free
choice inference and the inference of an adverbial modifier under negation.26 It seems to
have a reading that Miriam can’t play with her computer and that she can’t play with her
i-Pad after dinner, but before dinner, she has free choice between the two. That is, the free
choice inference seems to arise on top of the inference of the adverbial modifiers, similarly
to the multiplicity inference discussed above.
(38) Miriam can’t play with her computer or her i-Pad after dinner.
a.  Miriam can’t play with her computer and she can’t play with her i-Pad after
dinner, but before dinner she can play with one and she can play with the other
If this is true, then combining the implicature approach to the inference of the adverbial
modifier with an implicature account of the free choice inference straightforwardly predicts
the reading in (38).
More surprisingly, the implicature approach to the inference of adverbial modifiers also
predicts a conjunctive inference with a simple disjunction like (39). Namely, it predicts the
reading in (39a).
(39) Miriam didn’t go to Paris or Berlin by train.
a.  Miriam did go to Paris and she did go to Berlin (albeit not by train)
The presuppositional view, on the other hand, predicts the inference in (38a) but it doesn’t
predict the inference in (39a). In fact, it predicts (39) to have the inference in (40). While
the judgments are subtle and this should be investigated further, we think that if anything
(39) suggests (39a) rather that (40).
25 See Bar-lev & Fox 2017; Chemla 2008b; Fox 2007; Franke 2011; Klinedinst 2007; Santorio & Romoli 2017,
among others.
26 Again, as in the case of the multiplicity inference and the inference of the adverbial modifiers, the
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(40) Miriam went to Paris or Berlin but not both
Thus the cases involving disjunction appears to favour the implicature approach to the
inference of adverbial modifiers. On the other hand, the case of adjectives like good seems
to push in the opposite direction, suggesting that we should adopt the presuppositional view.
The general interaction between modifiers under negation and scalar terms requires there-
fore further exploration; an exploration which however goes beyond the scope of this squib.
To summarise, we have focused on the interaction between adverbial modifiers and
multiplicity inferences in sentences containing a plural noun and an adverb in the scope of
negation like This morning, Mike didn’t wash windows with soap. We have shown that a
reading of this sentence – entailing that Mike didn’t wash any window with soap but that
he did wash multiple windows (albeit not with soap) – is problematic for the implicature
approach to the multiplicity inference in combination with the implicature treatment of
the inference of adverbial modifiers. We have sketched two solutions for this problem.
The first was to keep the implicature approach to adverbial modifiers but adopting a non-
implicature approach to multiplicity, based on homogeneity. The second solution was to
keep instead the implicature approach to the multiplicity inference but treat the inference of
adverbial modifiers as a presupposition, in combination with the idea that presuppositions
can be strengthened via implicatures. Either way, the interaction between multiplicity and
the inference of adverbial modifiers suggests that we cannot treat both as implicatures: if
we want to treat either one as an implicature, we need to do something different for the
other.
Appendix: the formal details
A.1. Background: Magri’s approach
We adopt Magri’s proposal on the interaction between exhaustification and presuppositions
(see Gajewski and Sharvit 2009 for a very similar proposal).27 This proposal is based on
the following two components. First, it assumes a two-dimensional theory of meaning
(cf. Karttunen & Peters, 1979; see also Mandelkern 2016 for a more recent approach):
a sentence ϕ denotes two propositions, its presupposition [[ϕ]] prs and its assertion [[ϕ]] asr,
which, following Magri’s notation, we indicate as [[ϕ]] = [[ϕ]] prs, [[ϕ]] asr . Second, when a
sentence is parsed with an exh, the meaning of exh affects both dimensions of meaning. In
a nutshell, the assertion and presuppositional levels of a sentence are exhaustified.
(1) a. [[ exh ϕ]] = ([[ exh ϕ]] prs, [[ exh ϕ]] asr)
Magri, (2010 p.54) (see also Marty 2017, p.20-21) defines exh as follows: the strengthened
presupposition 〈 exh ϕ〉 prs and the strengthened assertion 〈 exh ϕ〉 asr as in (2): 〈 exh ϕ〉 prs
is the presupposition of ϕ conjoined with the negation of all the excludable presuppositions
and 〈exh ϕ〉 asr is the assertion of ϕ conjoined with the negation of all the excludable
27 Magri’s approach comes with the assumption of bidimensionality of meaning and with some
empirical issues pointed out in Marty 2017. For our purposes, however, it will suffice. But everything







niversitetsbiblioteket i Bergen user on 25 January 2021
468 Jacopo Romoli and Agata Renans
assertions. Here we follow Magri and Marty in assuming that the excludable alternatives are
those alternatives (the presuppositions of which) are non-weaker than the (presupposition
of the) prejacent.28
(2) a. Strengthened presuppositions:
(i) exclpres(ϕ) = {ψ ∈ alt(ϕ) : ϕprs  ψprs}
(ii) exh(ϕ)prs = ϕprs ∧ ∀ψ[ψ ∈ exclprs(ϕ)[¬ψprs]]
b. Strengthened assertions:
(i) exclasr(ϕ) = {ψ ∈ alt(ϕ) : ϕasr  ψasr}
(ii)  exh(ϕasr =ϕasr ∧ ∀ψ[ψ ∈ exclasr(ϕ)[¬ψasr]]
At the assertion level, exh operates in the same way as before. But now exh also has an
effect at the presuppositional level: it excludes the presuppositions of the alternatives that
are non-weaker than the presuppositions of the prejacent.
A.2. Back to multiplicity
Now let’s go back to our main case in (3a), presupposing (3b) by assumption in the
presuppositional solution we are considering here.
(3) a. Mike didn’t wash windows with soap.
b. Mike washed windows. presupposition
Using Magri’s notation, we have the presupposition and the assertion dimensions as
in (4) which is equivalent to (5). (Where pl = Mike washed windows (one-or-more),
ws = with soap, sg = Mike washed a window (one-or-more), two = Mike washed at least
two windows; to avoid clutter we use those symbols to represent both a sentence and its
meaning, keeping the assumptions outlined above about what exh takes as an argument
and operates on).
(4) 〈Mike didn’t wash windows with soapprs, Mike didn’t wash windows with soapasr〉
(5) 〈pl, ¬[pl ws]〉
A.3. Spector 2007
We can now combine the above with Spector’s approach to account for the relevant reading
of (3a). To illustrate, assume we parse it as in (6), schematised as in (7).
(6) exh[exh[not[Mike washed windows with soap]]]
(7) exh[exh[¬[pl ws]]]
The inner most exh applies to its prejacent ¬[pl ws] and exhaustifies its assertion component
with respect to its alternatives and its presupposition component with respect to the
presupposition of its alternatives. The outermost exh does the same: it exhaustifies the
assertion component of its prejacent exh[¬ [pl ws]] with respect to its (already exhaustified)
28 A more accurate rendition would need to assume innocent exclusion and possibly innocent
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alternatives and its presupposition component with respect to the (already exhaustified)
presuppositions of its alternatives.
(8) exh[exh[¬[pl ws]]] = 〈exh[exh[¬[pl ws]]]prs, exh[exh[¬[pl ws]]]asr〉
Let us illustrate this step by step focusing on the outcome of the presuppositional level and
then moving on the assertion level.
A.3.1. The presuppositional level Consider the innermost exh first: the alternatives on
which it operates are the alternatives of the prejacent ¬[pl ws]. At the presuppositional
level, following the definition in (2), exh excludes the presuppositions of those alternatives,
which are excludable in the sense above (i.e. non-weaker than the presuppositions of the
prejacent). At this stage, none of the presupposition is excludable (they are all entailed by









pl, ¬ [plws]〉 ,〈
sg, ¬ [sgws]〉 ,〈




Moving on to the second exh, leads to the following outcome: the alternatives on which
this operates on are the exhaustified alternatives of the prejacent and again at the presup-
positional level, the meaning of exh will negate the presuppositions of those alternatives,









pl, ¬ [plws] ∧ pl〉 ,〈
sg, ∧¬two, ¬ [sgws] ∧ two〉 ,〈




Note-and this is the crucial step-the presupposition of the alternatives above have
already been exhaustified by the meaning of the first exh at the presuppositional level, with
respect to the presupposition of their alternatives. In particular, crucially, the exhaustified
singular alternative repeated below in (11) is itself exhaustified with respect to the












〈two, ¬[two ws]〉 ,〈




The outcome is that the presupposition is indirectly strengthened recursively by exh
in Magri’s and Spector’s ways combined, giving rise to the strengthened presuppositional
inference that Mike washed at least two windows.
(13)
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In sum, the combination of Magri’s and Spector’s accounts derives the right strengthened
reading at the presuppositional level. We note that at each step exh only applies to a sentence
and its alternatives. However, given Magri’s bidimensionality of meaning assumption, it
now has an effect both on the assertion and the presuppositional dimensions. On the latter,
exhaustification is with respect to the presuppositions of the alternatives. The only novel
part in combining Magri’s system with Spector’s is the fact that we have to deal with more
than one exh. There is an issue, however, with what Spector’s approach predicts at the
assertion level, independently from the presuppositional solution.
A.3.2. The assertion level To illustrate the issue again here: consider now the assertion
part of the derivation above repeated in (14).
(14) [[exh [exh[ [¬pl ws ]]]]]asr
The alternatives over which the first exh operates are in (15), focusing on the assertion
part now. At this stage, both pl and sg (which are equivalent) are excludable, giving rise to









pl, ¬ [plws]〉 ,〈
sg, ¬ [sgws]〉 ,〈




The alternatives the second exh operates on are in (16), again focusing on the assertion










pl, ¬ [plws] ∧ pl〉 ,〈
sg ∧ ¬two, [sgws] ∧ two〉 ,〈




This is because that alternative is enriched with respect to the alternatives in (18) and at










sg, ¬ [sgws]〉 ,
〈two, ¬ [twows]〉 ,〈




The problem is that this alternative is now excludable therefore giving rise to the
unattested inference that Mike din’t wash windows with soap but he did wash exactly
one window.
(19) exh [exh [¬ [pl ws]]]asr = ¬pl ws ∧ ¬ [[sg ws] ∧ two] = ¬pl ws ∧ ¬two
In sum, by combining Magri’s and Spector’s approach one can derive the right multiplicity
inference at the presuppositional level. However, following the definition in (2), each exh
applies to its prejacent and strengthen both its assertion and presuppositions and this gives
rise to the outcome above. As we have seen, there is still an issue about the predictions at
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for our data. However, one could imagine a separate solution for that; one that maintains
the right result at the presuppositional level. For instance, one could imagine a system like
Magri’s where if the outcome at the presuppositional and assertion level are in conflict, the
former wins out to the latter.
A.4. Zweig 2009 and Ivlieva 2013
It is possible to make the account work also in Zweig’s and Ivlieva’s approach, if we make
some extra assumptions about exh and its distribution, as discussed below. Let’s move to
an event semantics and let’s use the notation in Zweig 2009 for ease of reference, where
∗window is the number neutral denotation. Let’s also assume that the meaning of the adverb
is combined with the rest as follows, introducing the presupposition as in follows (using
Heim and Kratzer’s 1998 notation for presupposition and assertion here, we will go back
to Magri’s notation below):
(20)  with soap = λPλe : P(e). P(e) ∧ with-soap(e)
The meaning of a sentence like Mike washed windows with soap before existential closure
over events is as in (21):
(21)  Mike washed windows with soap  =
λe : ∃X[∗window(X) ∧ ∗wash(e) ∧ ∗ag(e, m) ∧ ∗th(e, X)
. ∃X [∗window (X ) ∧ ∗wash(e) ∧ ∗ag(e, m) ∧ ∗th(e, X) ∧ with-soap(e)]
After existential closure and negation the meaning will end up being as in (22a), with the
presupposition in (22b), which has projected through negation: there is no event of Mike
washing one or more windows with soap and there is an event of Mike washing one or
more windows.
(22)  not[exh3[Mike washed windows with soap]] =
a. ¬∃e∃X[∗window(X) ∧ ∗wash(e) ∧ ∗ag(e, m) ∧ ∗th(e, X) ∧ with-soap(e)]
b. ∃e∃X[∗window(X) ∧ ∗wash(e) ∧ ∗ag(e, m) ∧ ∗th(e, X)
This doesn’t give us the right reading yet as it is too weak in the presupposition. However,
we can now combine Magri and Zweig and compute the multiplicity implicature below the
existential closure over events on the presuppositional level.
First we need to generalise exh to take predicates of events, so we generalise Magri’s
definitions in (2a) above as follows, where P and Q are predicates of events and their
presuppositions are also predicates of events, as above in (21).
(23) a. Strengthened presuppositions at predicate level:
(i) exclpres(P ) = {Q ∈ alt(P ) : Pprs /⊆ Qprs}
(ii)  exh(P ) prs =  P  prs ∧ ∀Q[Q ∈ exclprs(P )[¬ Q prs]
b. Strengthened assertions at predicate level:
(i) exclasr(P ) = {Q ∈ alt(P ) : Pasr /⊆ Qasr}
(ii) exh(P) asr =  P  asr ∧ ∀Q[Q ∈ exclasr(P )[¬ Q asr]
Now, we apply exh locally below existential closure, on the presupposition. In particular,
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where lower case variables range over atoms. As a result, we obtain (25).
(24)  Mike washed a window with soap prs =
λe∃x [∗window (x ) ∧ ∗wash(e) ∧ ∗ag(e, m) ∧ ∗th(e, x)]
(25)  exh[Mike washed windows with soap prs =
λe [∃X [∗window (X )∧∗wash (e )∧∗ag (e, m )∧∗th (e, X )]∧¬∃x [∗window (x )∧
∗wash (e)∧∗ag (e, m ) ∧ ∗th(e, x)]]
This gives us the right reading at the presuppositional level: a predicate of washing events
of more than one windows by Mike. When this is existentially quantified over it gives us
the right presupposition that there is an event of washing multiple windows by Mike.
Note, however, that to get the right reading we also need a way not to strengthened at the
assertion level or we would weaken the meaning of the assertion under negation. One can
imagine different ways of doing that, the choice of which also interacts with the standard
assumption of an economy condition that generally bans exhaustification if it weakens the
meaning of a sentence. The easiest way to do it is defining another exh, call it exh3 which
applies to a sentence in Magri’s way but it only has an effect on its presupposition. We
could imagine that this is invoked only if the regular exh would weaken the meaning at the
assertion level.
(26) a.  exh3 ϕ = 〈 exh ϕ prs,  ϕ asr〉
Putting it altogether, by applying (26) before existential closure and then applying existential
closure, we obtain the correct reading as follows: there is no event of Mike washing one or
more windows with soap and there is an event of Mike washing more than one window.
(27) not[exh3[Mike washed windows with soap]] =
a. ¬∃e∃X[∗window(X) ∧ ∗wash(e) ∧ ∗ag(e, m) ∧ ∗th(e, X) ∧ with-soap(e)]
b. ∃e∃X[∗window(X) ∧ ∗wash(e) ∧ ∗ag(e, m) ∧ ∗th(e, X) ∧ ¬∃x[∗window(x)
∧∗wash(e) ∧ ∗ag(e, m) ∧ ∗th(e, x)]]
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